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QUI"I' BEBAVIOR UllDER
The basic search model has, however, some obvious limitations. It is, for example, not without problems to use this model as a vehicle for understanding turnover in the labor market. A typical feature of job mobility is job-to-job changes without intervenient unemployment. ~1attila (1974) has estimated that the major fraction of voluntary jOb changes in the United States occur without interim unemployment and Holmlund (1983) indicates that qui ts into the unemployment pool are even more rare in the Swedish labor market. An obvious inferene e from these observations is that on-the-jobsearch appears to be of some empirical importance.
The superior search efficiency sometimes attributed to the unemployment state is not very convincing given the magnitude of job mobility without intervenient unemployment. (Reynolds, 1951.) In this paper we attempt to incorporate uncertainty about non-wage job attributes in the basic search-theoretic framework. We know of two earlier such attempts. Borjas and Goldberg (1978) show that the reservation wage rule holds even when the non-wage attribute is revealed af ter the acceptance decision is made. They show how the (unemployed) worker' s reservation wage is affected by uncertainty about the non-pecuniary component but attempt no analysis of quit behavior. The other study is by vVilde (1979) . Re considers a decision process where the worker is allml7ed to qui t when the non-wage attribute of the job is observed. Onthe-job-search is ruled out (by assumption) and the worker therefore always qui ts into unemployment. vvilde shows that quit probabilities are positi ve but provides no information of how condi tional quit probabilities change as tenure increases.
Our analysis focuses on the employed worker's search and quit behavior in a setting where the non-wage characteristic is revealed (imrnediately) af ter the acceptance decision is made. It is shown -5 -that quit probabilities decline as tenure increases, consistent with observed empirical regularities. We also prove that the (risk-neutral) worker is prepared to accept a wage offer that falls below his current full wage (in the absence of moving costs). The di fference between the current full wage and the acceptance wage represents the worker I s willingness to pay for participating in the "job change lottery".
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The Basic Mode1
Consider a worker who is employed at a particular money wage \'l=w. The job is also associated with a particular non-pecuniary attribute, Z=z, measured in the same uni ts as vJ. The worker I s full wage is accordingly y=w+z.
A worker contempIating search is facing a known wage offer distribution, f(w) and a conditionaI distribution of non-wage attributes, g(ZiW). We assume that E(Z)=O for all w. An offer is associated with an observable component, the money wage, as weIl as an unobservable part, the non-wage characteristic of the job. l The worker may choose to accept an offer or to refuse itj in the latter case the offer expires immediately. In case the worker accepts the offer and starts to work, the non-wage attribute is immediately revealed. The realized value of the full wage may weIl be such that continued search is considered.
The decision process is illustrated in Figure l . 
where c is the marginal search cost, CM is the moving cost and r is the discount rate. For simplicity, it is assumed that the range of Z is such that qui ts into search unemployment never will be considered. Note that the term y(l+r)/r is the present value of keeping the current job (and thereby receiving y forever).
The first claim establishesthat (l) has a solution.
Proposition l:
(a) There exists a unique continuous solution to the functional equation (l).
(b) V(y) is convex and increasing in y.
The proof is shown in the Appendix.
The optimal decision process involves two critical wage rates. First, there is a critical "search reservation wage", k. Hhen the full wage falls below this level, i. e. y < k, the worker is induced to search. The cri tical search wage is given as the solution to
Clearly, at the full wage y=k the worker is indifferent between searching and keeping his current job. Eq.(2) expresses this equality condition.
The next problem is to show that k is unique.
Proposition 2:
There exists a unique solution to (2).
The proof is given in the Appendix.
The searching worker has to dec ide on a reservation wage that separates acceptable offers from unacceptable ones. Hage offers for which w>w* hold are acceptable, w* being the "acceptance reservation wage". The latter is given as the solution to
where w*=w* (y). The next claim gives a sufficient condition for a unique w*.
Proposition 3:
If W and Z are independent, (3) has a unique solution.
If g(z;w)=g(z) is independent of w, the RHS of (3) is increasing in w* since V(·) course, uniqueness of w* holds less restrictive assumptions. The distribution of workers by tenure reflects an underlying distribution of full wages. Non-wage attributes, however, are in general only partially observed and tenure may be used as a proxy for the unobserved characteristics.
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Comparati ve Statics
Expression (6) provides information about the workerls "quit-tenure profile". In what follows we will foeus on how quit-probabilities are affeeted byehanges in the eurrent money wage (w) , the marginal seareh eost (e), the moving eost (C~1)'
the diseount rate (r) and the varianee of the distribution of non-wage attributes (0 2 ). z
Consider, first, the quit-response to a higher money wage.The derivative oPr(Qln,w)/ow in (6) is not easily signed for arbi trary val ues of n. However, for n=O we have
-00 whieh is deereasing in w. Henee, an inerease in the eurrent money wage unambiguously deereases the first-period quit probability.
Next, eonsider the effeet of an inerease in the marginal seareh eost. We obtain 2 oP be ök + ~ • öw* oe ow* oe where P = Pr(Q In,w). Since aP/ok > o it is clear that the first term in (9) is negative, i.e., an increase in moving costs implies a lower search probability.
From Figure 2 we can also infer that aw*/aC M > Oj when the cost of moving increases, the worker revises his acceptance wage upwards. Hence, the second term in (9) is negative for n = O (cf. Eq. An increase in 0 2 will also produce a larger c:: in z Figure 2 ; since the value of the "job lottery" has increased, the worker is willing to pay a higher price for participating in it. It follows that åW*/ÖO~ < O unIess C~'1 is very large. Hence,an increase in the variance of the non-wage attributes will most likely increase the first-period quit probability.
Finally, it should be noted that an increase in the discount rate implies a reduction in life-time income associated with keeping the current job forever (y(l+r)/r). However, there is also a downward shi f t of the V(.) function (Figure 2 ). The net effect on k and w* appears impossible to sign.
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Conc1uding Remarks
Several different explanations have been suggested for observed empirical regulari ties between tenure and quit rates. One of them is the specific human capital hypothesis, according to which the gap between the worker I s current wage and his market alternative increases with the length of the job.
Another story relies on unobserved heterogenei ty among workers. Since those who are inherently most mobile are most likely to show up with short tenure, the "duration dependence" of quit rates -16 -may reflect heterogeneity in unobserved individual characteristics.
We have in this paper suggested another explanation, based on a search theoretic framework expanded to account for imperfect information about non-wage job attributes. Those attributes are of ten difficult to observe prior to acc decisionsi hence jobs will be accepted (or refused) without full knowledge of the value of offers.
The introduction of non-wage attributes in a framework of optimal on-the-job search allows us to derive the worker's expected quit-tenure profile.
Conditional quit probabilities, at given money wage rates, are decreasing as tenure increases.
~Jorkers who sample favorable non-wage attributes are less likely to quit and will therefore be disproportionately represented among those with long tenure.
A number of issues have not been dealt with in the paper. A fairly straightforward extension of the model would be to allow quits into search unemployment. Another, and more difficult, extension would be to model learning behavior among employees. An environment in which a worker makes a once-andfor-all discovery of the true qualities of his job is clearly not very realistic. Although the importance of learning behavior should be recognized, we suspect that an appropriate analys is of it may require contributions from other disciplines than economics.
-17 - that smaller c and/or CM will give larger V n I s, i.e., larger V.
